

# BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER

### OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A SUSPENDED	)	Nos. 04-1113 and 04-2065
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF	)	
ARIZONA,	)	
	)	FINDINGS OF FACT,
PAUL G. MENKVELD,	)	<b>CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND</b>
<b>Bar No. 009766</b>	)	RECOMMENDATION OF
	)	HEARING OFFICER 91
Respondent.	)	
	)	

An aggravation and mitigation hearing was held on this matter on January 5, 2006 at 10:30 AM. The hearing was held in the offices of Chandler & Udall, LLP, 2100 Bank of America Plaza, 33 North Stone Avenue, Tucson, Arizona 85701. The State Bar of Arizona was represented by Angela M. B. Napper, Esq., bar counsel. Also present were Randall M. Sammons, Esq. And Jeffrey Carter, Esq. Respondent did not appear.

Based on the evidence produced and the evidence produced at the hearing, the hearing officer makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommendation.

### **Procedural History**

In this matter, Respondent failed to answer the complaint. All alleged violations have therefore been deemed admitted; an Entry of Default was filed pursuant to Rule 57(d), Ariz.R.S.Ct., on December 22, 2005. This aggravation and mitigation hearing was held before the hearing officer on January 25, 2006.

### Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law

### **General Allegations:**

- 1. At all times relevant, Respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having been admitted to practice in Arizona on March 21, 1985.
- 2. On April 13, 2005, the Board of Governors of the State Bar summarily suspended Respondent for failure to comply with mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

## Findings of Fact - Count One - (Fred Corron)

- 3. In January 2003, Fred Corron's (Complainant) mother, Rita J. Corron, died.
- 4. Shortly before Ms. Corron's death, Complainant's uncle, Ray Cotnoir, hired Respondent to administer the estate. Respondent met with Complainant in early February 2003, regarding the probate of the estate.

- 5. On March 11, 2003, in Pima Superior Court, PB 20030291, Complainant was appointed Personal Representative of the estate. The approximate value of the estate was \$70,000.
- 6. After a meeting between Respondent and Complainant discussing the distribution of the estate, it was decided that interim distributions would be made to the beneficiaries totaling \$50,000.00 and leaving a remainder of approximately \$20,000.00 to be held in Respondent's client trust account for the estate until final distribution.
- 7. After April 20, 2003, Respondent failed to return any of Complainants letters or telephone calls inquiring as to the status of the distribution of the estate.
- 8. On or about July 6, 2004, the State Bar's Attorney/Consumer Assistance Program ("ACAP") received an inquiry letter from Complainant regarding Respondent's lack of communication with Complainant and Respondent's lack of action in the probate of the estate.
- 9. By letter dated August 4, 2004, ACAP sent a copy of Complainant's inquiry letter to Respondent and requested his prompt attention to the matter.
- 10. On or about August 5, 2004, Respondent distributed another \$500.00 from the estate to Complainant.

- 11. In a letter dated November 5, 2004, James R. Beaman, Esq., contacted Respondent on behalf of Complainant. The letter requested communication from Respondent to determine the status of the probate and an accounting of the approximately \$25,000, to \$27,000, of estate money held in Respondent's trust account for the estate.<sup>1</sup>
  - 12. Respondent failed to contact Mr. Beaman or Complainant.
- 13. Mr. Beaman therefore advised Complainant to file a complaint with the State Bar.
- 14. On or about November 18, 2004, the State Bar received another inquiry from Complainant alleging Respondent's continued lack of communication and requesting an accounting of the estate money held in Respondent's client trust account. Complainant further stated that he was in "desperate financial straits" and needed his share of the estate funds held in Respondent's client trust account.
- 15. By letter dated November 30, 2004, bar counsel sent a copy of Complainant's submission to Respondent and requested a response within twenty (20) days.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based upon the estimated value of the estate and the early distribution totaling nearly \$50,000, the remainder held by Respondent was likely closer to \$20,000.00.

16. Respondent failed to respond to the State Bar's November 30, 2004, letter.

- 17. In a facsimile dated January 14, 2005, Complainant advised the State Bar that he had recently gone to Respondent's office requesting information, and that Respondent had failed to contact him thereafter.
- 18. By letter dated January 19, 2005, bar counsel reminded Respondent that he had not responded to the State Bar's letter dated November 30, 2004, and was given twenty (20) days to respond. The letter included copies of several additional submissions from Complainant, and advised Respondent that if he failed to respond he would be subpoenaed for a deposition.
- 19. Respondent failed to respond to the State Bar's January 19, 2005, letter.
- 20. On or about June 13, 2005, a subpoena duces tecum was issued in State Bar file nos. 04-1113, and 04-2065 requesting production of Respondent's client trust account bank records from the Bank of America ("the Bank") for the period of April 1, 1997, through June 30, 2005.
- 21. On or about July 15, 2005, bar counsel received a copy of Respondent's client trust account bank records from July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2005 from the Bank. The Bank could not provide records prior to July 1,

1998, because the Bank only retains records for a period of seven (7) years; therefore, those older than July 1, 1998 have been destroyed.

- 22. State Bar Staff Trust Account Examiner Gloria Barr reviewed Respondent's trust account bank records.
- 23. Based on the records provided by the Bank, Ms. Barr determined the following transactions were made for the benefit of Complainant in State Bar file no. 04-1113:

Date	Debit	Credit	Balance	Description	Payable to
08/25/03		\$69,731.95	\$69,731.95	Deposit	NO COPY PROVIDED BY BANK
08/29/03	\$6,000.00		\$63,736.95	1182	Nita Jane Heuser - estate of Rita J.
1					Corron
09/05/03	\$2,140.00		\$61,522.95	1183	Paul Menkveld PC – costs
10/02/03	\$6,000.00		\$55,522.95	1185	Barbara Helen Gruss - estate of Rita
<b> </b>	_ :				J. Corron
10/02/03	\$6,000.00		\$49,522.95	1187	Frederick Joseph Corron - estate of
ll	<u> </u>		ļ		Rita J. Corron
10/02/03	\$6,000.00		\$43,522.95	1188	David Douglas Corron - estate of
			1		Rita J. Corron
10/03/03	\$6,000.00		\$37,522.95	1184	Jennifer Rose Davis - estate of Rita
IL	_	<u>L</u>			J. Corron
10/03/03	\$6,000.00		\$31,522.95	1189	Gregory Paul Corron - estate of Rita
[L					J. Corron
10/06/03	\$6,000.00		\$25,522.95	1186	Theresa Marie Bacon - estate of Rita
		_			J. Corron
10/17/03	\$6,000.00		\$19,522.95	1190	Anthony Raymond Corron – estate of
II				]	Rita J. Corron
10/22/03	\$2,556.00		\$16,966.95	1191	Paul Menkveld PC – attorney's fees
12/02/03	\$1,710.00		\$15,256.95	1192	Paul Menkveld PC - fees
08/05/04	\$500.00		\$1,654.95	1201	Fred Corron - estate of Rita J.
<u> </u>					Corron

24. Bank records indicate that the initial deposit to the trust account for the Corron Estate was \$69,731.95.

- 25. Based upon Complainant and Mr. Beaman's assessments, Respondent should have held approximately \$25,000 to \$27,000 in trust for the estate after the initial disbursements.
- 26. Review of the bank records reveals that eight separate \$6000.00 distributions were made, presumably all to family members, most indicated by the same last name as the decedent, between August 29, 2003 and October 17, 2003, totaling \$48,000.00, such that Respondent should have held approximately \$21,731.95 in the trust for the estate after the initial disbursements.
- 27. After the final \$6,000.00 disbursement, Respondent's trust account balance fell below and remained below \$20,000.00 from October 18, 2003 through April 18, 2004 and again from April 19, 2004 to June 30, 2005.
- 28. Recent information received from the bank regarding Respondent's trust account indicates that as of August 23, 2005, Respondent's trust account was overdrawn in an amount of \$845.00.
- 29. Additional recent information received from the bank regarding Respondent's trust account indicates that Respondent's trust account was not properly established in accordance with Rule 44(a) and (c), Ariz.R.S.Ct., in as much as Respondent's trust account was not a readily identifiable interest-bearing trust account, and Respondent's trust account did not properly include the Arizona Bar Foundation's tax payer identification number.

30. After a detailed analysis of the bank records, Ms. Barr determined that Respondent disbursed funds through telephonic transfers, and not by prenumbered check or electronic transfer from his client trust account to another account as follows:

	·
Date	Transfer Amount
09/20/00	\$3,000.00
01/22/04	\$400.00
06/02/04	\$1,600.00
07/08/04	\$990.00
07/19/04	\$1,530.00
08/02/04	\$936.00
08/05/04	\$936.00
08/12/04	\$756.00
09/07/04	\$450.00
09/10/04	\$200.00
09/10/04	\$43.95

31. Ms Barr further determined that Respondent disbursed funds by withdrawal, and not by pre-numbered check or electronic transfer from his client trust account as follows:

Date	Withdrawal Amount
04/19/04	\$35,000.00
08/30/04	\$200.00

# Conclusions of Law - Count One (Fred Corron)

By failing to abide by Complainant's decisions concerning the 32. objectives of representation, specifically, by failing to expedite the administration of the estate, Respondent violated ER 1.2(a).

- 33. By failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Complainant and expediting the administration of the estate, Respondent violated ER 1.3.
- 34. By failing to communicate with Complainant, Respondent violated ER 1.4(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4).
- 35. By abandoning the representation, but reimbursing himself from the estate funds for legal services, Respondent collected an unreasonable fee and therefore violated ER 1.5(a).
- 36. By failing to timely and appropriately distribute funds held in the estate, Respondent violated ER 1.15, Rule 43 and Rule 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct.
- 37. By having a trust account balance in August 2004 less than that which should have been held in trust for his client and the estate, Respondent failed to safeguard client funds and protect client property in violation of ER 1.15, Rule 43, and Rule 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct.
- 38. By effectively abandoning the case, ceasing all communication with Complainant, Respondent failed to terminate his representation in such a way that protected Complainant's interests and therefore violated ER 1.16(d).
- 39. By failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite the administration of the estate, Respondent violated ER 3.2.

- 40. By failing to make all trust account disbursements by pre-numbered check or by electronic transfer, Respondent violated Rule 43(d)(4).
- 41. By failing to properly establish his trust account as an identifiable, interest-bearing trust account, and failing to include the Arizona Bar Foundation tax payer identification number on the account, Respondent violated Rule 44(a) and (c).

### Findings of Fact - Count Two - (Randall Sammons, Esq.)

- 42. On or about April 29, 1997, Victoria Enderle (decedent) died. Shortly thereafter Respondent was hired by decedent's mother, Donna Westenberg to handle the probate of the estate.
- 43. On or about May 8, 1997, the decedent's holographic will was filed in the Pima County Superior Court, P 27828. Ms. Westenberg was appointed Personal Representative of the estate.
- 44. The beneficiaries of the estate were Ms. Westenberg and decedent's two then minor children, Crystal Enderle and Clint Enderle.
- 45. Pursuant to the will, decedent left her home, personal property and money held in checking and savings accounts to be equally divided between Crystal and Clint. Decedent's Amway distributorship, Enterprises International, Inc. was to be divided as follows: 20% to Ms. Westenberg, 40% to Crystal and 40% to Clint.

46. On or about December 16, 1997, Respondent assisted in the sale of the decedent's Amway distributorship for \$82,500.

- 47. During the administration of the estate Respondent marshaled certain assets of the estate and received assets on behalf of the estate that were previously held in Mexico.
- 48. In or about 2000, Crystal, having reached the age of majority, began to inquire as to why the estate had not yet been closed.
  - 49. Respondent did not respond to Crystal's inquiries.
- 50. Frustrated by Respondent's non-response, Crystal hired Randall M. Sammons, Esq. (Complainant) to represent her in making inquiries regarding the estate.
- 51. In letter dated October 17, 2001, Complainant asked Respondent about the status of the estate and requested that the estate be distributed and closed.
- 52. Respondent failed to respond to Complainant's October 17, 2001, letter. Instead, Respondent filed with the court an Accounting and Proposal for Distribution that was contrary to the plain language of the will. Respondent proposed that a substantial portion of the liquid assets of the estate be distributed to Ms. Westenberg and that the non-liquid assets be distributed to Crystal and Clint.

- 53. Thereafter, on or about November 29, 2001, Crystal and Clint filed a Petition for Removal of Personal Representative and the matter proceeded to litigation.
- 54. A tentative settlement was discussed between Ms. Westenberg and the children wherein certain funds previously expended by Ms. Westenberg and Respondent were to be returned to the estate, and Crystal would be substituted as the Personal Representative. The parties did not settle under these terms.
- 55. Ms. Westenberg then terminated Respondent's services and retained new counsel. Thereafter, the parties did reach an agreement regarding the Stipulation for the Substitution of Personal Representative, naming Crystal as the new personal representative.
- 56. Respondent refused to settle regarding his claims for attorney's fees against the estate and elected to proceed to trial. The estate hired an expert witness, William Wissler, Esq., to testify regarding the compensation paid to Respondent during the course of his representation of the estate.
- 57. On June 3, 2003, after hearing both Mr. Wissler's and Respondent's testimony, the court found that Mr. Wissler's testimony was persuasive and his estimation of hours was realistic. The court ordered that counsel submit memoranda as to whether the estate was entitled to reimbursement of attorney's fees previously received.

- 58. The court directed that the estate file an Application for Fees, which was filed. Respondent opposed the Application for Fees. The court entered an award of fees to the estate in connection with the litigation. Respondent failed to reimburse the estate for fees previously received as ordered by the court.
- 59. Complainant prepared and lodged a Judgment with the court and a copy was sent to Respondent on or about January 30, 2004. Respondent did not file any objections to the form of the Judgment.
- 60. On February 23, 2004, the Honorable Clark W. Munger, entered judgment against Respondent in a total amount of \$20,370. Respondent was to reimburse the estate for fees previously received in the amount of \$13,890.00 and was to pay an additional \$6480.00 in attorney's fees and expert fees. The court further found that Respondent had "unnecessarily expanded the litigation in connection with this matter and [had] not acted in good faith in connection with this matter and [had] not acted in good faith in connection with the settlement of this matter, and otherwise breached his fiduciary duties to this Estate."
- 61. The testimony of Complainant, Randall Sammons, presented at the aggravation hearing affirmed the approximate total amount owed to the estate, Mr. Sammons and an expert, per the judgment of the court and that Respondent, as of the date of the hearing, had not paid the judgment.

- 62. On or about March 10, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial or, in the alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The court denied Respondent's motion. Respondent failed to make any arrangements for the payment of the judgment.
- 63. On or about May 10, 2004, Complainant noticed Respondent for a Supplemental Proceedings deposition. A subpoena duces tecum was issued for Respondent to appear and provide tax returns and bank statements.
- 64. On July 21, 2004, Respondent appeared for the Supplemental Proceedings deposition but informed the court that he was not of sufficient health to withstand the examination. The court ordered Respondent to provide Complainant with certain documents by July 23, 2004, and additional documents by August 20, 2004.
- 65. Respondent failed to provide Complainant with all the documents as ordered by the court.
- 66. On or about August 27, 2004, Complainant filed a Motion for Sanctions against Respondent.
- 67. In addition, in a letter dated August 27, 2004, Complainant asked Respondent his intentions regarding payment of the judgment. Complainant further informed Respondent that due to his lack of cooperation and communication regarding payment of the judgment Complainant had filed a

Motion for Sanctions with the court and had requested Client Protection Fund application information from the State Bar.

- 68. Respondent did not file a response to the Motion for Sanctions and failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on August 31, 2004. At the hearing the court ordered Complainant to file a Notice of Hearing on the Motion for Sanctions. Another court date was set.
- 69. On September 27, 2004, Respondent again failed to appear at the hearing on the Motion for Sanctions. The court ordered Complainant to inform the State Bar of Respondent's actions and inactions regarding Respondent's representation of the estate.
- 70. In a letter to the State Bar dated December 7, 2004, Complainant alleged specifically the ethical misconduct committed by Respondent.
- 71. In a letter dated January 11, 2005, the State Bar informed Respondent of the allegations received from Complainant concerning his conduct. Respondent was given twenty (20) days to respond.
- 72. Respondent failed to reply to the State Bar's letter dated January 11, 2005.
- 73. In a letter dated February 17, 2005, the State Bar sent Respondent a reminder to referencing the letter dated January 11, 2005, and requested a response. Respondent was given twenty (20) days to respond.

74. Respondent failed to reply to the State Bar's letter dated February 17, 2005.

- 75. On or about June 13, 2005, a subpoena duces tecum was issued in State Bar file nos. 04-1113, and 04-2065 requesting production of Respondent's client trust account bank records from the Bank of America ("the Bank") for the period of April 1, 1997, through June 30, 2005.
- 76. On or about July 15, 2005, bar counsel received a copy of Respondent's client trust account bank records from July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2005 from the Bank. The Bank could not provide records prior to July 1, 1998, because the Bank only retains records for a period of seven (7) years; therefore, those older than July 1, 1998 have been destroyed.
- 77. None of the transactions in the bank records indicated any disbursements or deposits made for the benefit of the Enderle estate or Ms. Westenberg.

### Conclusions of Law – Count Two (Randall Sammons, Esq.)

- 78. By collecting an unreasonable fee Respondent violated ER 1.5.
- 79. By acting in bad faith and failing to cooperate in expediting the litigation consistent with the interests of the estate, Respondent violated ER 3.2.
- 80. By failing to provide documentation to Complainant as was ordered by the court, Respondent violated ER 3.4(c) and Rule 53(f).

81. By failing to attend at least two hearings set by the court, Respondent violated ER 3.4(c) and Rule 53(f).

<u>Findings of Fact - Count Three - failure to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings (State Bar)</u>

- 82. On or about February 15, 2005, a Subpoena under State Bar file nos. 04-1113, and 04-2065, was issued compelling Respondent's appearance at a deposition on March 15, 2005, at 9:30 a.m. The subpoena was sent certified mail to Respondent's address of record with the State Bar, 177 N. Church, Suite 200; Tucson, Arizona.
- 83. On or about February 17, 2005, a Heather Schmitz signed the certified mail delivery receipt for the subpoena.
- 84. By letter dated March 7, 2005, bar counsel reminded Respondent of the deposition scheduled for March 15, 2005.
  - 85. Respondent failed to appear for the March 15, 2005 deposition.
- 86. In or about the end of March 2005, despite the receipt having been signed by Heather Schmitz, the envelope containing the subpoena was returned to the State Bar stamped "returned to sender UNCLAIMED." On the packet the address of record for Respondent had been crossed out and a residential apartment address, 3407 N. 2<sup>nd</sup> Avenue, #2109, Tucson, Arizona, was handwritten on the envelope. In addition, another certified mailing certificate was affixed to the back of the envelope, presumably by someone at Respondent's

87. On or about May 26, 2005, a State Bar investigator, Vic Ayala traveled to the address of record for Respondent. The receptionist at that location, 177 N. Church, informed Mr. Ayala that Respondent had not worked in the office building for the past four months and had not left a forwarding address or telephone number.

- 88. Mr. Ayala next traveled to the residential apartment address handwritten on the subpoena packet that had been returned to the State Bar, 3407 N. 2<sup>nd</sup> Avenue #2109. Mr. Ayala made contact with Respondent who identified himself as an active attorney, working from his apartment. Respondent indicated that he would be moving to another apartment soon. Respondent refused to provide Mr. Ayala with his new address. Respondent refused to provide or verify his telephone number.
- 89. On or about June 13, 2005, a subpoena duces tecum was issued in State Bar file nos. 04-1113, and 04-2065, requesting that Respondent appear for a deposition July 19, 2005, at 10:00 a.m. at the State Bar offices and requesting that he bring all files pertaining to the estate/clients at issue in State Bar file nos. 04-1113, and 04-2065, and all client trust account records for the period of April 1, 1997, through June 20, 2005.

- 90. On June 15, 2005, at 8:49 p.m. Respondent was personally served with the subpoena duces tecum at the residential apartment address.
- 91. Respondent failed to appear for the July 19, 2005, deposition.Conclusions of Law Count Three (State Bar)
- 92. By failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority in State Bar file no. 04-1113, Respondent violated ER 8.1(b).
- 93. By evading service and refusing to cooperate with the staff of the state bar in State Bar file no. 04-1113, Respondent violated Rule 53(d).
- 94. By failing to furnish information to bar counsel in State Bar file no. 04-1113, Respondent violated Rule 53(f).
- 95. By failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority in State Bar file no. 04-2065, Respondent violated ER 8.1(b).
- 96. By evading service and refusing to cooperate with the staff of the state bar in State Bar file no. 04-2065, Respondent violated Rule 53(d).
- 97. By failing to furnish information to bar counsel in State Bar file no. 04-2065, Respondent violated Rule 53(f).

98. By failing to provide the state bar office a current street address and telephone number within thirty days of its effective date Respondent violated Rule 32(c)(3).

99. By engaging in all of the foregoing misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, as referenced and specified in Counts One, Two and Three of this complaint, Respondent violated ER 8.4(d).

### **Legal Analysis**

When a Respondent is properly served and noticed and fails to respond as required by the rules, allegations of the complaint are deemed admitted. Rule 53(c)1, Ariz.R.S.Ct., *In re Zang*, 158 Ariz. 251, 762 P.2d 528 (1988).

In this case, Respondent was served the original complaint by regular first class mail and by certified restricted delivery mail to the last address provided by Respondent to the Bar pursuant to Rule 47(c), Ariz.R.S.Ct. Respondent was also served by regular first class mail to his last known physical address as ascertained by State Bar investigators. Notice of Service of the original complaint was filed with the Disciplinary Clerk, as required by rule, on September 12, 2005. Respondent refused service of the certified mail. The regular mail sent to his address of record was returned as undeliverable. Mail sent to Respondent's physical address was not returned.

Respondent was served the amended complaint by regular first class mail and by certified restricted delivery mail to the last address provided by Respondent to the Bar pursuant to Rule 47(c), Ariz.R.S.Ct., and to his last known physical address as ascertained by State Bar investigators. Notice of Service of the amended complaint was filed with the Disciplinary Clerk, as required by Rule, on November 2, 2005. Respondent refused service of both the certified mailings. All regular mail was returned.

The State Bar received no returned mail that indicated a forwarding address had been provided to the post office. To date, the State Bar has received no change of address notice from Respondent. The State Bar has received no telephone calls or email correspondence from Respondent.

In determining the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary matter, the analysis should be guided by the principle that the ultimate purpose of discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to set a standard by which other lawyers may be deterred from such conduct while protecting the interest of the public and the profession. *In re Kersting*, 151 Ariz. 171, 726 P.2d 587 (1986).

### Application of the ABA Standards:

The American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions are a "useful tool in determining the proper sanction." In re Cardenas, 164 Ariz. 149, 791 P.2d 95 (1990). In drafting the ABA Standards the Committee

developed a model which requires the body imposing sanctions to consider the following four factors: 1) the duties violated; 2) the lawyer's mental state; 3) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. *Standard 3.0*.

In this matter, Respondent violated duties to his clients and duties to the legal profession. Specifically, Respondent violated his duties to his clients by failing to exercise due diligence, failing to communicate, and failing to abide to the objectives of the representation. Respondent violated his duties to the legal profession by failing to cooperate in expediting litigation, failing to provide documentation as ordered by the court, and failing to cooperate with lawful requests for information concerning this disciplinary matter.

The second prong of the analysis under the *Standards* is the lawyer's mental state when engaging in misconduct. In this matter, Respondent's mental state was at least knowing, if not intentional. The *Standards* do not account for multiple charges of misconduct. Knowing is defined as "the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." Intentional is defined as "the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." *See, Standards* at page 7. Respondent failed to respond to his client despite repeated requests by the client in count one. Respondent failed to cooperate with the

 tribunal in count two. Respondent failed to cooperate with the State Bar in count three. Each of these suggests conscious awareness of the conduct. Taken collectively, the misconduct suggests that Respondent intended to accomplish the particular results of his inaction.

The ultimate sanction imposed in disciplinary matters should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations; it might well be and generally should be greater than the sanction for the most serious misconduct. *See Standards* at page 6. *In re Redeker*, 177 Ariz. 35, 868 P.2d 318 (1994).

In this matter the following *Standards* should therefore be considered:

Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

- (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client: or
- (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (c) lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client. Lack of Diligence Standard 4.41

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

Failure to Preserve Client's Property - Standard 4.11

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public or the legal system.

Standard 7.1

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Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

Standard 7.2

Most generously construed, Respondent's violations warrant at least a longterm suspension, but the public and the profession are best protected by disbarment.

The third prong to be considered under the *Standards* is the injury or potential caused by Respondent's misconduct in these matters. The harm is as follows. As to Count One, Fred Corron suffered actual and serious injury by virtue of the loss of approximately \$14,000.00 from the estate of his mother, which Respondent was hired to probate. As to Count Two, Randall Sammons and his clients suffered actual and serious injury by virtue of Respondent' failure to reimburse the estate and pay attorney's fees totally over \$20,000.00. The legal system has suffered actual injury by Respondent's failure to cooperate not only with the courts, but also with the disciplinary process.

Last, aggravating and mitigating factors are to be considered. The applicable aggravating factors, as set forth in *Standards* 9.22, are as follows:

- (b) dishonest or selfish motive;
- (c) a pattern of misconduct;
- (d) multiple offenses;
- (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

- (i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
- (j) indifference to making restitution.

From the evidence, it can be inferred that Respondent had a selfish motive when he failed to diligently communicate with his client, Fred Corron, in order to conceal his failure to maintain the integrity of the estate. Similarly, from Respondent's card, a selfish motive to keep unreasonable fees charged to the estate and in failing to repay the judgment as ordered by the court in the matter of the Estate of Victoria Enderle, can be inferred.

Respondent has demonstrated a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses by virtue of the two cases relevant in this matter.

Respondent failed to make any effort whatsoever to respond to the Bar, to request assistance or extensions, or otherwise comply with his duties under the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers.

Respondent's failure to respond in this matter may be interpreted as a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.

Respondent has been licensed to practice law in Arizona since 1985.

Respondent's failure to respond in this matter, his failure to return the balance of the estate to Fred Corron, and his failure to pay the judgment as awarded in the Estate of Victoria Enderle may be interpreted as an indifference to making restitution.

The only mitigating factor to be considered in this matter, as set forth in Standard 9.32(a), is Respondent's absence of a prior disciplinary record.

### **Proportionality Review**

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567 (1994) (quoting *In re Wines*, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Matter Riley*, 142 Ariz. 604, 615 (1984).

In reviewing the proportional sanctions and conduct of other cases, the following are instructive.

In re McDaniel, SB 05-0134-D (2005), Respondent violated ERs 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) & (b), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 3.2, 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(b), 8.4(c) & (d) and Rules 53(b), (c), (d) and (f). Respondent failed to exercise due diligence and competence by failing to act timely and with candor. Respondent failed to keep his clients informed and to pursue their legitimate interests in an appropriate manner. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the State Bar's inquiries and to respond to the complaints. Respondent was suspended for six months and one day. In McDaniel, Respondent appeared and participated in the

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aggravation/mitigation hearing at which time the hearing officer found seven aggravating factors and six mitigating factors. The misconduct was knowing and there was actual injury to the clients.

In re Miranda, SB 05-0126-D (2005), Respondent violated ERs 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 1.7(b), 1.8(a), 1.15(a), (b), & (e), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.4(c) & (d) and Rules 43, 44, 53(d) & (f). In multiple counts, Respondent failed to preserve client property, failed to perform services for clients as contracted, failed to avoid a conflict of interest, and failed to maintain personal integrity. Respondent engaged in blatant self dealing, demonstrated a lack of candor, and converted client property for his own personal use and benefit. Respondent also failed to respond or cooperate with the State Bar's investigations. Respondent was disbarred. There were nine aggravating factors, and no mitigating factors. The misconduct was knowing, and there was serious injury to Respondent's clients.

In re Reed, SB 05-0083-D (2005), Respondent violated ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.6, 3.2, 5.5, 8.1(b), 8.4(c) & (d) and Rules 31(b), 43, 43(d), 44, 51(h) & (i) and 53 (d) & (f). Respondent engaged in a pattern of violations of the rules regarding management of his client trust account. Respondent failed to diligently represent and communicate with clients and failed to respond or cooperate with the State Bar's investigation. Respondent accepted a three-year

suspension. There were three aggravating factors and three mitigating factors.

The misconduct was knowing and there was only potential injury.

In re Brown, SB 05-0054-D (2005), Respondent violated ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(a), 1.16, 3.2, 8.4(d) and Rule 32(c)(3) and 53(d) & (f). After receiving substantial retainers, Respondent abandoned clients and their cases and refused to return any fees paid. Respondent failed to communicate with his clients, failed to return files containing original documents, and lied to clients about the status of their cases. Respondent also failed to respond or cooperate with the State Bar's investigation. Respondent was disbarred. There were six aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. The mental state was knowing and there was serious injury.

In re Clark Supreme Court No. SB-04-0086-D (2004), addressed misconduct involving violations of Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16(d), 8.4(d) and Rule 51(h). Clark was suspended for six months and one day and was ordered placed on probation for a period of two years effective upon reinstatement. The facts in Clark involved three separate underlying cases wherein Respondent failed, to various degrees, to diligently represent clients. In each case Respondent failed to timely respond to the State Bar's allegations. Aggravating factors included prior discipline, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, failure to cooperate with the screening

of ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 3.2, 4.1, 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) as well as Rules 43, 44 and 51(h). The hearing officer found four mitigating factors (multiple offenses, bad-faith obstruction, failure to acknowledge misconduct and substantial experience) and two mitigating factors (no disciplinary history and no

making restitution. No mitigating factors were found.

In re Counce, Supreme Court No. SB-03-0071-D (2003), involved misconduct for violations of Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2 and 8.1 as well as Rule 51(h) and (i). Counce was suspended for six months and one day and ordered placed on probation for a period of two years upon reinstatement. The facts in *Counce* (2003) involved only one underlying case. Counce failed to respond to the State Bar during the investigation.

dishonest or selfish motive). Crown was suspended for six months and one day.

investigation, substantial experience in the practice of law and an indifference to

In re Crown, SB-03-0129-D (2003): Crown engaged in multiple violations

After the above-referenced suspension, a second case was considered, *In re Counce*, Supreme Court No. SB-03-0163-D (2004), which resulted in Counce's disbarment. *Counce* (2004) involved violations of Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.4, 8.1(b), 8.4(c) & (d), 1.16(d), 3.3, and 4.1. The facts in this second matter involved four underlying cases. Aggravating factors included prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, multiple

offenses, failure to comply with disciplinary rules, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct and substantial experience in the practice of law. No mitigating factors were found.

In re McFadden, SB-00-0072-D (2000): McFadden was the subject of a five-count complaint alleging that he failed to communicate with clients, respond to their repeated inquiries and return unearned retainers. The hearing officer found three aggravating factors (multiple offenses, failure to cooperate with State Bar and substantial experience) and one mitigating factor (no disciplinary history). McFadden was suspended for two years. However, in addition to his client-related misconduct, he had practiced law while suspended for nonpayment of bar dues and noncompliance with MCLE requirements.

In re Elowitz, 177 Ariz. 240, 866 P.2d 1326 (1994), involved violations of Rule 42 Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16(d), 3.2, 3.3(a), 3.4(b), 8.1, and 8.4. Elowitz was disbarred. The facts involved six underlying matters wherein Elowitz violated a number of duties to his clients and the legal system. The court found only one mitigating factor, absence of a prior disciplinary record.

In re Henry, 168 Ariz. 141, 811 P.2d 1078 (1991), involved violations of Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ERs 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16(d), 8.1, and 8.4.

Henry was disbarred for his misconduct. The court found several aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.

### Conclusion

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. *In re Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994).

Here, Respondent appears to have abandoned his practice. Respondent either intentionally or knowingly engaged in significant, repeated acts of misconduct that resulted in serious harm to his clients. Respondent also failed to respond to the disciplinary process, causing harm to the legal system and to the profession. Of significant concern is Respondent's apparent misappropriation of funds from the Estate of Rita J. Corron and his failure to repay the judgment ordered in the Estate of Victoria Enderle. Additionally, Respondent is currently suspended for MCLE violations.

### Recommendation

Therefore, the Hearing Officer recommends disbarment. In addition, Respondent should be ordered to pay restitution in the following amounts:

Count One: \$21,231.95 to the Estate of Rita J. Corron. \$6,406.00 for attorney's fees charged since services of little value were rendered, plus interest at the statutory rate, and \$14,825.95, the amount that should have been held in trust by Respondent. The amount of \$14,825.95 was calculated by deducting from the initial estate deposit of \$69,731.95, attorneys fees in the amount of \$6,406.00 and distributions to heirs of the estate in the amount of \$48,500.00.

Count Two: \$20,370.00 to the Estate of Victoria Enderle, plus interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry of the judgment. This amount has been previously determined by the court and was ordered by a judgment entered in the Pima County Superior Court on February 24, 2004. A copy of the judgment is attached as Exhibit A.

In the event that the victims of Respondent's misconduct are made whole by application to the State Bar Client Protection Fund, Respondent should be likewise ordered to reimburse the client protection fund in the appropriate and applicable amounts.

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Lawyer Regulation Records Manager State Bar of Arizona 4201 N. 24<sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 200 Phoenix, Arizona 85016

by: Arofessy